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Just as there was a curious affinity that kept
[Thomas] Mann’s American readers faithful to him even
when his writing was most “difficult” . . . so we can
detect in other realms of thought what the Germans call
Wahlverwandtschaften. Some styles of thinking
prospered, and others withered or barely held their own
in the new American setting.
– H. Stuart Hughes, The Sea Change1
Wer keine Heimat mehr hat,
dem wird wohl gar das Schreiben zum Wohnen.
– Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia2

Introduction
Some European émigrés were notoriously ungracious in acknowledging the
nations that took them in and saved them from the concentration camps. Theodor
Adorno estimated that 90 percent of his German publications were written during his
eleven-year exile in the United States,3 but Adorno nonetheless complained that his
American editors characterized his writing as “poorly organized,” an indignity that,
Adorno says, no German editor would have inflicted on him.4 In his unsurpassingly
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unguarded memoir, Rückblicke, Hans-Joachim Schoeps proudly relates his efforts to
return to Germany as soon as the war ended.5 Like Adorno, Schoeps is not reluctant to
speak dismissively of the Swedes who saved him from extermination, noting that the
“normal” Swede gets by with an unbelievably small vocabulary and relies so heavily on
stereotypical expressions that one can predict with great certitude what the common
Swede will say when confronted with certain situations.6
Schoeps was a historian of ideas and religion. His contributions to the social
sciences were significant, but he was not a foundational thinker.7 Adorno, on the other
hand, became a U.S. academic cultural hero. His critique of the American culture
industry only contributed to the industry in cultural criticism – poorly organized or
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Teutonic English into a passable imitation of the literary language, and the
public, accustomed to the slipshod writing of so many American-born authors,
did not protest.
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otherwise – in the U.S. markets and elsewhere.8 Adorno scorned America, but the
American academy adores Adorno.9
The experience of Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) in the United States has been the
reverse of Adorno’s. Apparently, Kelsen was one of those émigré intellectuals whose,
“style of thinking,” as Hughes put it “withered or barely held [its] own in the new
American setting.”10 Kelsen’s relative obscurity continues despite a recent revival of
interest in German legal theory among U.S. academics. Oddly enough, that revival of
interest, which has been spearheaded by self-described post-Marxists and other
progressives seeking to develop a new critique of liberalism, has not focused on Kelsen
and his social-democratic critics, instead latching onto the writings of Kelsen’s Nazi
nemesis, Carl Schmitt.11 Interest in Schmitt has continued to grow, as reflected in the
recent writings of America’s leading legal economics and law theorist, Richard Posner.12
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Still, one finds surprisingly little American legal scholarship addressing Kelsen’s
writings.13 In this paper, I shall explore the reasons underlying the rejection by the U.S.
legal academy of Kelsen’s brand of legal positivism and propose an area of American
jurisprudence where a Kelsenian intervention might be welcome. Simply put, as I have
argued elsewhere, 14 if we are going to look to German theory to help us address the
conundrums of liberal jurisprudence, it would be nice if we could rely on a German who
was not a Nazi.
In Part I of this essay, I provide some biographical information regarding Kelsen,
as well as a brief outline of the reception of his work both in the United States and
internationally. In Part II, I sketch the basic elements of Kelsen’s pure theory of law. In
Part III, I offer some theories as to why the American Academy rejected Kelsen’s
approach to law. Finally, in Part IV, I suggest that Kelsen’s theories can assist the
American legal academy today as it continues to struggle to address the problem of
indeterminacy in adjudication.

I.

Kelsen’s Life and Reputation
Kelsen was born in Prague in 1881. His father was a skilled artisan who worked

with lighting fixtures and eventually opened his own shops, first in Prague and later, a
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few years after Kelsen’s birth, in Vienna.15 Kelsen originally wanted to study
philosophy but he had not been an outstanding student and so admission to the
philosophical faculty would have been a challenge. Recognizing that hurdle and the
additional difficulties of finding a career as a philosopher, Kelsen chose to study law.16
He received his doctorate in 1906 and completed his Habilitationsschrift, which was the
first book-length articulation of his legal theory, in 1911.17 That same year, Kelsen
received his first appointment at the University of Vienna as a Lecturer (Privatdozent) in
the fields of public law and legal philosophy (Staatsrecht und Rechtsphilosophie).18 He
also taught constitutional and administrative law, as well as trade and exchange law for
an academy operated by the Austrian Trade Ministry.19
During World War I, while continuing his scholarly research and publication,
Kelsen served in the military and began work on drafting what would eventually become
the constitution of the new Austrian Republic.20 In 1918, the law faculty at the
University of Vienna named him assistant professor (Extraordinarius) and in 1919 full
professor (Ordinarius) of public and administrative law (Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht).21
He was one of the framers of Austria’s 1919 constitution, and he set up Austria’s

15

Rudolf Aladár Métall, HANS KELSEN: LEBEN UND WERK (Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1969), at 2. Métall’s
book is still treated as the definitive Kelsen biography, and it is a rich source of factual information and
partisan gossip. However, it was written by one of Kelsen’s students whose touching devotion to the man
precludes any critical engagement with Kelsen’s thought or his life.
16

Id. at 4-5.

17

Id. at 8, 14.

18

Id. at 15.

19

Id. at 19.

20

Id. at 18-28.

21

Id. at 28, 38.

5

Constitutional Court on which he also sat from 1921 until 1930.22 The sheer volume
Kelsen’s scholarly output during this period is simply overwhelming, comprising
approximately 200 books and articles published while Kelsen was studying and teaching
in Vienna.23
By 1930, Vienna’s fabled gemütlichkeit had worn thin for Professor Kelsen. He
ran afoul of the ruling Christian Social Party, in large part due to his role in a lengthy
series of legal disputes relating to Austria’s policy of permitting Catholics to remarry.24
In connection with his involvement with these cases, Kelsen was subjected to withering
attacks.25 His position at the University became increasingly uncomfortable when two of
his colleagues joined in these attacks.26 It was time for Kelsen to move on, and so he
took up a position on the law faculty at the University of Cologne. Karl Renner, the
Austrian politician and jurist who had invited Kelsen to participate in drafting the
Austrian constitution, regretted that political forces had made Vienna inhospitable to
Kelsen and hailed Kelsen in the Wiener Allgemeinen Zeitung as “the most original
teacher of law of our time.”27
At the time of the Nazi seizure of power, Kelsen, an Austrian Jew who converted
to Catholicism in 1905,28 was Germany’s leading legal theorist and the Dean of the
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Faculty of Law at the University of Cologne.29 Forced from his university post because
of his Jewish ancestry, Kelsen fled to Geneva in 1933 and to the United States in 1940.30
When Kelsen was forced from his position in Cologne, six of his seven colleagues on the
law faculty (Carl Schmitt was the exception) protested the removal of Kelsen from the
faculty and characterized his departure as “not only a painful loss to the University of
Cologne, but also a blow to the reputation of German scholarship.”31 In 1934, the
American legal theorist, Roscoe Pound, characterized Kelsen as “undoubtedly the leading
jurist of the time.”32 A generation later, the leading English positivist theorist, H. L. A.
Hart, considered Kelsen “the most stimulating writer on analytical jurisprudence of our
day.”33
Kelsen seems to have taken to his place of refuge, as he remained here and died in
Berkeley in 1973. 34 Kelsen thus spent 30 years actively engaged in scholarship and
teaching in the U.S. and at visiting professorships abroad,35 but his approach to legal
theory never found a following in the United States, even as his reputation grew
internationally. Karl Llewellyn, a leading practitioner of the realist school of
jurisprudence, regarded “Kelsen’s work as utterly sterile,” although he acknowledged
29
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Kelsen’s intellect.36 Echoing Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous dictum that the life of the
law is not logic but experience, Harold Laski denounced Kelsen’s legal theory as a sterile
“exercise in logic and not in life.”37 To this day, outside of the area of public
international law, where his influence is unavoidable,38 Kelsen and his ideas are rarely
considered in the American legal academy.

II.

Elements of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law
A.

Natural and Positive Law

Before the advent of American realism (and Kelsen wrote just as American
realism was being formulated), theories of jurisprudence generally could be divided into
natural law theories and positivist theories. Natural law theorists believe that there can be
an objective justification for law – that is, there can be good laws and bad laws – and that
such objective standards are available because all law derives from universal principles,
which themselves derive either from God’s law or from rules of reason.39 Positivists
believe that laws are simply posited and are valid for their society if they are properly
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derived from the sovereign and are backed up by the threat of sanction.40 The German
tradition of statutory positivism, in which Kelsen was trained and to which his pure
theory of law is a response, thus sought to justify even the authoritarian acts of the
Bismarckian Reich as lawful because issued by, or in the name of, a legitimate
sovereign.41
In most circumstances, in modern legal systems – and certainly in international
law – the positivist position wins out because, as a practical matter, one’s certainty that
one’s conduct is just (either as a matter of God’s law or by whatever other measure one
uses to establish absolute truth) is of no consequence if the law says otherwise.
Moreover, however much we’d like to think of the law as a moral or ethical code, our
experience of the lobbying, logrolling, special interest politics and voter manipulation
that is at the heart of contemporary legislative politics tells us that, whatever else the law
might be, it is not a reflection of a universal consensus regarding ethical conduct.
However, the tension between natural law principles and positivist principles becomes of
great consequence on every occasion when a lawmaker – either a legislator or a judge
facing an issue of first impression – has to formulate a new rule of law. In that context,
doctrines of principle have a distinct advantage over the relativism that positivism
engenders. However, as discussed in Part IV below, the challenge for liberal
jurisprudence is to articulate the means by which a principled approach to the law can be
constrained so that it reflects not merely the moral preferences of the law giver or of the
40
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majority but also protects the fundamental rights of protected classes, the poor, or those
who otherwise seek protection through consistent and equitable enforcement of laws of
general applicability.

B.

Elements of the Pure Theory of Law

Kelsen’s approach to legal theory was a significant departure from both legal
positivist and natural law theory in that Kelsen “undertook to develop . . . a legal theory
purified of all political ideology.”42 His neo-Kantian theory sought to establish the a
priori categories underlying law that made legal norms present to cognition.43 These
categories are distinct from analogous categories underlying theories of ethics,
psychology, biology and theology, the concepts of which, in Kelsen’s view, had come to
dominate legal theory and thus block the realization of a pure theory of law.44 Kelsen’s
theory of law is thus “pure” in two senses. First, it purports to be free from any
ideological considerations and it makes no value judgments concerning the comparative
advantages of different legal systems. Second, Kelsen thus seeks to create a science of
law as an autonomous field, divorced from politics and morality but subject to objective
rules.
Kelsen distinguishes his science of law from the natural sciences, in that mere
observation does not tell us anything about how the law operates. For example, to a
neutral observer, a jury sentencing a criminal defendant to death might look a lot like a
criminal syndicate ordering a hit. The two events cannot be distinguished in terms of
42
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their outward appearances, but only by reference to norms that provide a scheme of
interpretation of the events.45 The notion that only certain conduct is legally cognizable
is familiar to any legal practitioner who has ever struggled to find a cause of action that
will afford his client a remedy. We might, for example, find it morally reprehensible to
force one person to witness the torture of another. For the most part, however, the
common law provides that the person forced to witness the torture of another has a
legally cognizable claim against the torturer only if the witness suffers bodily harm as a
result or if the torture victim is a member of the witness’s “immediate family.”46
Similarly, we might think it immoral to breach one’s contracts, but the law will only take
cognizance of a breach – and grant a remedy to the non-breaching party – if that party has
suffered some economic harm as a result of the breach.47 While this mode of thinking
about law as divorced from morality is wholly alien to natural law theory, it can be
reconciled with the American realist school. One thinks, for example, of Holmes’
characterization of contract as an agreement to either perform or to pay damages in case
of breach.48
Kelsen envisions law as a normative science. Because of its normative character,
law has certain formal resemblances to ethics or morality. The structure of legal systems,
according to Kelsen, is that they consist of certain normative rules which instruct the
45
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subjects of law how they ought to behave. Law differs from ethics or morality, however,
in that it is indifferent to the substance of those rules and in that the consequence of
violating a legal norm is legal sanction rather than moral or ethical sanction.49
Kelsen’s most important departure from the Kantian schema is his replacement of
the Kantian category of causation with the concept of “imputation” (Zurechnung) in order
to create a logical system of law in which cause and effect are linked through oughts.50 If
we have a legal norm that says contracts must be honored and A breaches his contract, A
ought to be subject to legal sanction. However, by limiting his pure theory of the law to
the study of legal norms, Kelsen did not mean to rule out the possibility of moral, ethical
or political critiques of law. On the contrary, Kelsen considered what he called “legal
sociology” to be a worthwhile endeavor, but one distinguishable from the pure theory of
law:
It asks, say, what prompts a legislator to decide on exactly these norms
and to issue no others, and it asks what effects his regulations have had. It
asks how religious imagination, say, or economic data influence the
activity of the courts, and what motivates people to behave or to fail to
behave in conformity with the legal system.51
Similarly, with respect to the relationship between law and morality, Kelsen rejects not
“the dictate that the law ought to be moral and good; that goes without saying . . . .
Rather, what is rejected is the view that the law as such is part of morality, and that
therefore every law, as law, is in some sense and to some degree moral.”52 Nonetheless,
the most common critique of positivist systems of law such as Kelsen’s is that they lead
49
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to moral relativism and provide no basis for a principled opposition to an unjust legal
system.53

III. The American Reception of Kelsen
While Kelsen was alive and actively engaged in scholarly research and
publication, his writings were reviewed in America’s leading legal periodicals, but the
reviews were one or two-page discussions of often lengthy and always complex works,
and the reviewers tended to be partisans who announced their programmatic allegiance to
or opposition to Kelsen’s approach. 54 Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State55 was
selected as the first volume of the American Academy of Legal Scholars’ Twentieth
Century Legal Philosophy Series.56 However, the American legal academy produced no
significant or lengthy responses to this or to Kelsen’s other writings.57 The Columbia
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Law Review assigned the task of reviewing Kelsen’s critique of the United Nations to the
director of that organization’s legal department.58 Not surprisingly the review was less
than enthusiastic. The review rejects the premise at the heart of Kelsen’s work, noting
that “the Charter is not just a legal text . . .; it is a political document designed to embody
statements of ideals, of principles, and of moral sentiment.”59
Kelsen’s highly theoretical and largely deductive approach to the law was easy
pickins for American pragmatists, whose attention to the fine details of legal doctrine
focused on Kelsen’s many empirical errors. Thus, Oscar Shachter took Kelsen to task for
failing to give effect to the principles he espoused in his 1950 work The Law of the
United Nations.60 In the book, Kelsen claims to entertain “all possible interpretations” of
law relevant to the law of the United Nations.61 Schachter’s review is devoted to
enumerating some of the significant (even leading) interpretations that Kelsen ignored,
and Schachter wonders whether Kelsen’s “‘purely juristic’ anslysis has not actually been
influenced by ideological (or shall we say, crypto-political) considerations,” from which
Schachter infers “that Kelsen’s underlying objective is a revision of the Charter . . . and a
building of a new organization closer to his own heart’s desire.”62 Louis Sohn, like
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Schachter, a leading light of the U.S. international legal community, similarly faults
Kelsen for showing “his preference for one interpretation, ordinarily the most inadequate
one form the point of view of organizational progress, with complete disregard of
alternatives.”63
More generally, politics doubly doomed Kelsen to failure in the United States.
American jurisprudence in the twentieth century and to this day has prided itself on its
hard-headed realism, or pragmatism. While Kelsen is a towering figure in the field of
public international law, even in the U.S., his insistence that law must be treated
separately and differently form politics renders him unpalatable even to American
practitioners of international law. The very first sentence in the casebook that I used this
semester in teaching public international law runs as follows: “First, law is politics.”64
The author of that sentence, Louis Henkin, is one of the editors of the casebook and, as
the Chief Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Third Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, one of the most influential scholars in the field of
public international law.65 Kelsen’s approach is simply antithetical to the dominant
approach to law in the United States, and his reception here reflects that fact. Most
Americans cannot make any sense of his work or find it not worth the bother because his
premises contradict the fundamental tenets of the American approach to law.
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A second reason for Kelsen’s failure to reach an American audience has to do
with the substantive politics of the American academy in the post-war era. Kelsen’s
theory failed political litmus tests because, although Kelsen personally supported
parliamentary democracy, his desire to produce a pure theory of law required him to
avoid connecting the system of law to any substantive political theory.66 Unable to
reconcile the privileging of a particular political perspective with the relativism that
informs the positivist tradition, Kelsen created a system in which the legal constraints on
state action are purely formal. Any action by a state official is valid, from the perspective
of the pure theory of law, so long as the official was authorized to take that action.67 Of
course, such action can still be subjected to external normative critique, but at a time
when fascism and totalitarianism posed genuine threats to the ascendancy of democracy
as the global model for governance, Kelsen’s theory did not seem to American legal
theorists to provide a sufficiently robust defense of democracy or for sufficient
safeguards against abuses of the law by fascist or totalitarian governments.
Kelsen’s theory and legal positivism generally are thus susceptible to attack on
the ground that they provide no principled opposition to unlawful governments. While a
government may come into power through illegal means, the legal order established by
such a usurping government may nonetheless be legitimate according to positivist theory.
And Kelsen’s theory has indeed been exploited by criminal governments in court cases in
which the legitimacy of the legal order established by those governments has been
66
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challenged.68 The criticism is based on a fundamental misconception not only regarding
the aims of Kelsen’s legal science but also regarding the capabilities of legal theory per
se.
It is certainly the case that Kelsen’s theory recognizes that legal rules promulgated
by a usurping government are law to the extent that the usurping government can enforce
its laws. Within Kelsen’s system, the question is simply one of efficacy. However,
Kelsen’s theory in no way equates technical legality with moral legitimacy. Indeed, the
purpose of his system is to identify the qualities of legal norms as distinct from moral or
social norms. And Kelsen recognizes that a regime’s lack of moral legitimacy can have a
negative impact on its attempt to establish its legal system. To the extent that a
government lacks political legitimacy, it may not be able to maintain its monopoly on the
use of force, and that in turn will undermine the efficacy of its rules and deprive those
rules from being recognizable as law.
But the larger point is that all ways of thinking about the law can be manipulated
to suit the purposes of usurping governments. We should recall that nearly all
governments come into being through unlawful processes, and the more sophisticated of
such governments come to power armed with political, moral and legal arguments
justifying their claim to power. Jurists who resist such power will not be jurists for long,
and those who remain behind will ultimately recognize, one way or the other, that the
usurping power has full legal authority. Kelsen at least recognizes that judicial officers
are limited in their powers – they can only enforce rules that are legal norms – that is,
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rules that can be enforced by the governing power. It is for this reason that Richard
Posner recognizes in Kelsen a fellow pragmatist.69
In addition to the political hurdles to a positive reception of Kelsen in the United
States, there were also stylistic issues. Kelsen’s writing style, heavily larded with neoKantian jargon, demands a reader familiar with the neo-Kantian tradition and with the
European style of legal reasoning, which is based far less on case precedent than are
common law systems of legal reasoning and thus is far less grounded in empiricism and
includes few discussions of concrete, actual or hypothetical scenarios.70
Finally, Kelsen continued to refine and revise his legal theory throughout his
lifetime, periodically revisiting, supplementing, replacing or abandoning positions that
were central to his earlier thought. Stanley Paulson, one of the leading North American
explicators of Kelsen’s work, divides his thought into three distinct periods – a
“constructivist” phase, associated with Kelsen’s Habilitationsschrift of 1911; a neoKantian phase that culminated in the 1934 Reine Rechtslehre, and finally a volitional
phase associated with the 1960 edition of the Reine Rechtslehre.71 In addition, Kelsen
published lengthy treatises in 1945, the General Theory of Law and State, and
posthumously in the General Theory of Norms. In each of these systematic treatments,
Kelsen altered his theory in response to new critical impulses and challenges to his pure
theory of law. In short, Kelsen is hard to read without a solid grounding in continental
69
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philosophy, he is susceptible to the charge of lacking empirical rigor, and he is a moving
target.
In any case, many American critics of Kelsen focus exclusively on the alleged
political shortcomings of his approach to law and thus ignore a vast corpus of legal
thought that touches on a vast array of topics. Kelsen published over 400 works during
his lifetime, covering not only topics in the field of jurisprudence but also in
constitutional law, international law, the history of law and philosophy, contemporary
politics and political theory.72 Although there have been some collections of scholarly
essays on Kelsen’s work,73 there has yet to be a serious scholarly monograph on Kelsen’s
legal theory as a whole published in the United States.

IV. Kelsen and the Problem of Indeterminacy
One key problem that liberal theories of adjudication have tried to address runs as
follows: Liberals value laws that are of general applicability, clear, widely disseminated,
prospective in nature, and consistent both in substance and in application. Inevitably,
however, there are gaps in the law that administrators and judges have to fill on a caseby-case basis.74 Consequently, the law is underdetermined, and contemporary legal
theorists debate both the extent and the consequences of this underdetermination or
indeterminacy of the law. Formalists are the group of legal theorists least concerned with
indeterminacy. Such thinkers generally believe that the problem of indeterminacy arises
72

Calsamiglia, 13 RATIO JURIS, at 197. Métall provides a listing of over 600 works that Kelsen published
up to 1966, but the list includes translations and book reviews. Some of the more surprising titles include a
100-page essay on the idea of Platonic love, a forty page essay on war crimes tribunals, and numerous
writings on achieving peace through law. See Métall, at 124-155.
73

See, e.g., Richard Tur & William Twining (ed.), ESSAYS ON KELSEN (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986);
Salo Engel (ed.), LAW, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER : ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HANS KELSEN
(Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press, 1964).
74

Scheuerman, CARL SCHMITT, at 4-5.

19

only in the rare “hard case” that falls outside of the clear guidance of existing law.75 But
the dominant approach to law in the United States, legal realism generally views legal
rules as providing inadequate guidance to legal decision-makers.76 From this perspective,
thinkers as diverse as Richard Posner and Ronald Dworkin are really no different from
the legal realists, but they look to external sources of objectivity and uniformity in order
to regularize legal decision-making processes. For Posner, the laws of economics guide
legal reasoning; for Dworkin, judges apply the law coherently when they interpret the law
to accord with the political morality of the community.77 Critical legal theorists are so
suspicious of the discretion exercised by the government that they find legal
indeterminacy to be the inescapable rule, and critical legal theorists despair of finding the
means to resolve the problem of indeterminacy.78 For critical legal theorists, judges and
legislators simply exercise their power in realms where the law is indeterminate.79
Because Kelsen’s approach to the law is so different from that of American legal
theorists, his notions concerning legal indeterminacy defamiliarize this familiar
conundrum, thus offering the possibility of a new perspective and new insights. In
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Kelsen’s view, the legal norm is always incomplete until it has been “individualized”
through application to a particular case.80 As Kelsen puts it,
[t]he higher-level norm cannot be binding with respect to every detail of
the act putting it into practice. There must always remain a range of
discretion . . . so that the higher-level norm, in relation to the act applying
it (an act of norm creation or of pure implementation) has simply the
character of a frame to be filled in by way of the act.81
Thus, on the issue of indeterminacy, Kelsen does not distinguish between easy cases
(cases of “pure implementation” of an exising norm) and hard cases (acts of norm
creation). He does not see any difference between what a judge does when she applies an
existing norm to a particular case and when she creates a new legal norm in order to
address a case of first impression.
Kelsen notes that indeterminacy is not only inevitable but it is often also
intended.82 Our legislators know, when they create laws, that the laws will be subject to
interpretation and implementation by courts or by administrative agencies, and they
entrust those courts and administrative agencies with discretion to act within the
indeterminate realm. Kelsen thus does not regard the discretion exercised by courts and
administrative bodies and threatening the integrity of his norm-based legal system. On
the contrary, his system is flexible enough to permit a range of possibilities for filling the
gap, all of which remain governed by the system of norms as interpretive frame.83 But
Kelsen flat out rejects the notion that there is only one proper way of interpreting the law
or filling in the gaps between legal norms. As he succinctly puts it, “From the standpoint
of the positive law, however, there is no criterion on the basis of which one of the
80
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possibilities given within the frame of the norm to be applied could be favoured over the
other possibilities.”84 Bowing to the inevitable, Kelsen concedes that norms established
through judicial decision are no different from legislative acts – they are acts of will.85
On the one hand, this reasoning seems to put Kelsen in the critical legal studies or
radical realist camp – indeterminacy is everywhere and judges make decisions according
to their (possibly idiosyncratic) predilections. But Kelsen concludes that, because the
system is one that assumes that norms are only realized when applied in an individual
case, there are, in fact, no gaps in the law and no problem of gap-filling.86
Kelsen’s solution to the problem of indeterminacy seems to return us, by sleight
of hand, to the formalist position. In theory, an effective legislature lays down normative
rules which judges apply in accordance with a subsidiary set of rules for the
implementation of legal norms, thus producing a gapless legal system in which
indeterminacy is tamed through the will of lawmakers. But Kelsen’s system, despite its
theoretical and abstract character, is resolutely realist, as Posner has noted. Like other
realist approaches, it calls on academics to awaken from their theoretical reveries and
address the world as it exists. In particular, Kelsen seems to suggest that the problem of
indeterminacy or of gaps is best addressed at the constitutional level and not through a
critique of adjudication. That is, once we have recognized that there is no way around
indeterminacy, it becomes incumbent upon us – to the extent that we are concerned that
courts and administrative agencies might act in an arbitrary and capricious manner – to
design a system of government that provides maximal guidance to those courts and
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agencies and ensures, to the greatest extent possible, that there is recourse in the event of
an unconscionable outcome.
Kelsen’s solution to the adjudicatory conundrum also points us to a new starting
point – democratic theory. We have to accept that, regardless of how painstakingly
legislators set forth legal norms based on a democratic mandate, some body – perhaps a
court, perhaps an administrative agency – will have to implement those norms in
individual cases. If we are concerned that such bodies are not accountable to the
electorate through democratic processes, then perhaps we ought to consider means of
making them so. But the fact that we have, at least at the federal level, not done so
suggests that our concern with indeterminacy is, on the whole, trumped by our concern
with having laws implemented by individuals and bodies who have developed the legal
expertise to do so in accordance with the legal norms established by the legislature.

Conclusion
The foregoing discussion sets forth the academic and political context for the
American legal academy’s rejection of Hans Kelsen’s legal theory. There was no affinity
between the highly abstract pure theory of law and the legal realism that dominated
American jurisprudence during Kelsen’s 30-year sojourn in the United States. Today,
however, as Richard Posner has noted, it is clear that the political climate in the U.S.
legal academy in the post-war era obscured the similarities in approach linking Kelsen’s
pure theory with American pragmatism. Now, as American jurisprudence is, for the first
time, looking to continental theorists to help them address the issue of legal
indeterminacy, for Kelsen to make his belated contribution to the “sea change” in the
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American human sciences that H. Stuart Hughes so insightfully described thirty years
ago.
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